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REFORMING DODD-FRANK:  IS THE FINANCIAL 
CHOICE ACT – OR ANY OTHER LEGISTLATION 
PROPOSED – THE RIGHT CHOICE? 
 
 
by 
 
 
Roy J. Girasa 
Jessica A. Magaldi** 
Joseph DiBenedetto*** 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A political storm has arisen with the election of 
President Donald Trump in 2016.  President Trump inherited a 
Republican Senate and House of Representatives, somewhat 
comparable to the election of the Democrat President, Barack 
Obama, who initially had a Democrat legislative body eight 
years before.  The U.S. economy was radically different at each 
commencement, with Obama facing the greatest financial crisis 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s while Trump 
witnessed a mainly recovered and prosperous economy.  When 
President Trump took office, the unemployment rate had fallen 
from approximately 10 percent to below five percent, 
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bordering on what some economists would term “full 
employment.”  Nevertheless, the economic status of many 
Americans remained stagnant as of 2016, causing an 
unexpected surge of dissatisfied voters who opted to change 
their political party-designation based upon the hope of the 
fulfillment of the slogan “Make America Great Again,” the 
assumption underlying the slogan being that the United States 
no longer had the global economic and political power it once 
possessed.   
 
 A major alleged cause for the claim that America is not 
great was the proliferation of governmental regulation and 
oversight that allegedly was responsible for less than desired 
economic prosperity for middle- and lower-class American 
workers.  This Article will explore the pros and cons of federal 
financial regulation – and efforts made to overturn a vast 
segment of the regulations.  We will examine key provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the regulatory provisions enacted 
pursuant thereto that often cause consternation among the 
affected financial participants.   
 
DODD-FRANK ACT AND REGULATIONS  
 
President Trump’s Executive Orders 
 
President Donald Trump issued a series of executive 
orders to limit government regulation of large segments of the 
economy.  One of his first executive orders was entitled, 
“Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs.”1  
Historically, the claim by President Trump that excessive 
regulation impeded economic growth was the not the first such 
claim by a Republican President.  President Ronald Reagan, in 
office from 1981 to 1989, also attributed the financial crisis he 
inherited upon taking office to over-regulation of industry; 
therefore he issued Executive Order 12291 as one of his first 
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actions as President.2  That order, which is similar in scope and 
content to President Trump’s Executive Orders of January 30, 
2017 stated that each agency shall consider and prepare an 
analysis of the regulatory impact of every major rule.3 
President Trump issued a further Executive Order4 requiring 
the head of each executive agency to submit within 180 days a 
proposed plan to reorganize the agency in order to improve its 
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability.  
Recommendations sought were the elimination of unnecessary 
agencies, components thereof, agency programs, and the 
merger of functions.  The factors to be considered are:  
 
(i) whether some or all of the functions of an 
agency, a component, or a program are 
appropriate for the Federal Government or 
would be better left to State or local 
governments or to the private sector through 
free enterprise; 
(ii) whether some or all of the functions of an 
agency, a component, or a program are 
redundant, including with those of another 
agency, component, or program;  
(iii) whether certain administrative capabilities 
necessary for operating an agency, a component, 
or a program are redundant with those of 
another agency, component, or program;  
(iv) whether the costs of continuing to operate an 
agency, a component, or a program are justified 
by the public benefits it provides; and 
(v) the costs of shutting down or merging agencies, 
components, or programs, including the costs of 
addressing the equities of affected agency staff.5 
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Thus, the combined Presidential and Congressional actions 
raise the issue of governmental regulatory actions as 
roadblocks to economic expansion.   
 
Purposes of Regulatory Oversight under the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
 The Dodd-Frank Act6 was passed in 2010 solely by the 
unanimous vote of Democrat representatives in the House and 
the required super-majority of Senators in the Senate.  In the 
face of total opposition of Republican legislators, the Act was 
signed into law by President Barack Obama in order to curb 
alleged significant abuses and lack of oversight by federal 
agencies that led to the 2007 recession.  The demise of Lehman 
Brothers and the near demise of major financial institutions led 
the federal government to institute a major bailout of troubled 
banks and other entities to prevent the collapse of these 
institutions both domestically and worldwide.   
 
Factors That Led to Economic Collapse: 
 
 There were a number of causes that led to the critical 
juncture of determining which responses were to be undertaken 
by the federal government.  Those opposed to government 
bailouts believed that troubled institutions should be allowed to 
liquidate in accordance with market theory under capitalism or 
other economic theories7 while other commentators and 
government officials such as U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson Jr. and Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke believed 
that the failure to rescue them through TARP program8 would 
cause a massive financial breakdown comparable to or worse 
than the Great Depression of the 1930s.9  
 
 The ostensible causes for the 2007 financial near 
collapse are many and are often recited according to the 
ideological preferences of the commentators.  Nevertheless, 
2019 / Reforming Dodd-Frank / 74 
 
there appears to be a consensus of the major factors that led to 
it.  The initial cause appears to be the grant and sale of 
subprime mortgages, that is, mortgage loans grated to home 
buyers who could ill afford to pay the monthly premiums 
particularly when the premiums initially given at “teaser” rates 
(rates that were very low but due to rise after one or more 
years) or if the homeowner lost his or her job or became 
incapacitated.  Inasmuch as the cost of housing kept rising 
almost daily, there appeared to be no risk because the homes 
could be sold at a profit in the event the homeowner was 
unable to make the monthly payment.  These loans, often 
consisting of the entire often highly inflated value of the home 
and even the closing costs, were pooled, packaged into levels 
of tranches depending on risk at increasing interest rates and 
sold to investors, including pension and mutual funds and 
foreign banks.  Such investors heretofore believed the loans to 
be nearly risk-free.   
 
 The pooled mortgages were used to back securities 
called collateralized debt obligations.  The major rating 
agencies gave the instruments unjustified high ratings, either 
due to lack of knowledge of the new forms of complex 
financial securities or outright neglect, as they profited from 
the fees from making the ratings in competition with each 
other.  When homeowners began having difficulties making the 
premium payments, their properties were foreclosed upon.  
These many thousands of foreclosures were partly responsible 
for the ensuing death spiral of bank closures and job losses.10  
As described by another scholar, the death spiral consisted of a 
fall in the value of the inflated asset value that was backed by 
high leverage which then led to margin calls compelling 
investors to sell the asset which then lessened the value of the 
asset; the fall in value lessened the collateral backing the initial 
leveraged credit boom; which in turn forced a fire sale of the 
75 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
asset and the cascading resulting financial events vicious circle 
of repeated events.11   
 
 There were other factors that contributed to the 
mortgage crisis.  Forbes attributed the crisis to the removal of 
the separation of investment from commercial banks under the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 2009 (the “2009 Act”) whereby 
banks were now able to engage in high risk behavior but also 
buttressed by the guaranteed deposits by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”); the Fed’s low interest prime 
rates; the new forms of loans by poorly understood 
mechanisms; credit agencies compliance; unregulated 
derivatives and their  uncontrolled explosion; nonbank 
financial ventures; looser capital SEC requirements; lack of 
governmental oversight; compensation tied to short-term 
performance that led to high risk behavior; Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac underwriting of high risk loans; among other 
factors.12 
 
 There were international macro-and micro-economic 
causes for the financial downturn.  Among them were the 
decline in short-term interest rates brought about in part by 
central banks, the opening of the Chinese economy, and the fall 
of the Soviet Union that led to downward pressure on wages 
and prices especially with the decline of labor unions; the 
growing demand for mortgages; the increased market for 
securitized bonds; and the rise of shadow banking were all 
contributing factors in the global economy of which the U.S. is 
the major player.13   
 
Dodd-Frank Act Reform Efforts 
 
 The 2009 Act, consisting of 16 titles, covered the 
largest segments of the U.S. economy and sought to remedy the 
perceived fault lines that led to the 2007 crisis.  The major 
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concern was the promotion of the financial stability for the 
domestic economy.14  It established the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (“FSOC”), whose membership is composed 
of ten voting members and five non-voting members.  
Members’ duties include identifying risks to the financial 
stability of the U.S. that could arise from the material financial 
distress or failure, promote market discipline, responding to 
emerging threats to the U.S. financial system or activities of the 
large interconnected banking and non-banking financial sectors 
of the economy.15  FSOC is given the authority to supervise 
nonbanks (engaged in shadow banking), which previously had 
essentially been unregulated but now often became subsidiaries 
of bank holding companies.16  FSOC was empowered to 
investigate and determine which financial institutions when 
facing possible collapse could lead to the overall harm to the 
general economy and make them subject to enhanced and 
somewhat prudential standards so as to prevent their demise or 
lessen the negative impacts such as those that ensued in the 
wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and American 
International Group.17 
 
 Additional areas of regulation of the 2009 Act include 
regulation of hedge fund advisers and others, insurance orderly 
liquidation for systemic risk companies, additional securities 
laws regulation, consumer protection by the creation of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and mortgage loan 
financing.18  
 
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE THROUGH THE 
FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT19 
 
 In the House of Representatives, Jeb 
Hensarling,20chairman of the House Financial Services 
Committee, introduced a bill, Financial Choice Act of 2017 
(the “Choice Act”)21 which, in essence, would substantially 
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modify or repeal major provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act of 
2010.22  The bill was passed by the House of Representatives 
by a vote of 233 to 186 with no Democrat Representative 
voting for the bill.  There is virtually no chance of passage in 
the Senate due to the opposition of Democrat senators who 
would filibuster such enactment and would require a super-
majority vote of 60 of the 100 senators.  The Republican 
legislators could attempt to bypass the supermajority required 
by passing a regulatory relief bill through reconciliation which 
requires only 50 votes in the Senate.23  The bill raises, among 
many other issues, whether the regulations created pursuant to 
the Dodd-Frank Act are excessive and thereby impose too high 
a regulatory burden upon financial institutions and an 
impediment to the overall U.S. economy.   
 
 Former Senator Phil Gramm,24 former chairman of the 
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee and 
co-author of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999,25 which 
removed the separation of investment banks from commercial 
banks, testified on May 10, 2017 that the principal cause of low 
economic growth in the U.S. has been the result of the 
regulatory burden placed upon the financial sector of the 
economy.26  In essence, the argument made by Gramm and 
others was that, although major financial institutions can afford 
to retain compliance officers to supervise and assure regulatory 
compliance, nevertheless, small entities, particularly 
community banks and credit unions cannot afford to retain 
such expertise.  The net result allegedly is harm to the overall 
economy causing it to have less than optimum annual gross 
domestic product, which averaged 3.2 percent since 1947 and a 
first-quarter 2017 growth rate of 1.2 percent.27   
 
2019 / Reforming Dodd-Frank / 78 
 
Key Provisions of the Choice Act 
 
 Although the Choice Act, as of this writing has little 
chance of passage in the U.S. Senate, nevertheless, it does 
provide a comprehensive exposure of the Republican platform 
that has sought to lessen what it perceives to be the regulatory 
stranglehold on the domestic economy.  It is anticipated that 
the Senate will emulate most of the key provisions of the 
Choice Act.  Thus, we will review and discuss the key 
provisions of the bill and the likelihood of passage by both 
houses of Congress.   
 
 The 350-page proposed Choice Act (called by 
democrats “The Wrong Choice Act”)28, is composed of 12 
titles.  It substantially alters the Dodd-Frank Act by repealing 
the Volcker Rule, gutting the Orderly Liquidation Authority, 
and repealing the Fiduciary Duty rule. It practically reduces the 
protections of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and 
exempts banks from alleged onerous requirements provided 
they hold 10 percent of capital assets.  The first major change 
is stated in Title I, Subtitle A, “Ending “Too Big to Fail” and 
Bank Bailouts, Section 111, repeals the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority.    
 
Choice Act Title I:  Ending “Too Big to Fail” and Bank 
Bailouts 
 
Repeal of the Orderly Liquidation Authority:   
 
Although Title I of the Choice Act emphasizes the 
termination of taxpayer assistance to troubled banks, it does so 
by ending the Dodd-Frank Act mechanism for identifying those 
financial institutions which, if they were to become financially 
insolvent would cause substantial stress to the overall U.S. and 
global economies as discussed above.29 Rather than identifying 
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“systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”) by 
FSOC under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and making them 
subject to enhanced prudential standards,30 the Choice Act 
substitutes a bankruptcy procedure for a “covered financial 
corporation” defined as a bank holding company, which is 
corporation whose primary purpose is to own, control, or 
finance subsidiaries having a total consolidated assets of $50 
billion or more, or such ownership or control of financial  
assets relating to depositary institutions represents 85 percent 
of the consolidated assets of the corporation.31  
 
 The proposed elimination of the orderly liquidation 
authority (“OLA”) as an alternative to a Chapter 7 or Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code32 and its replacement of SIFI with 
an exclusive bankruptcy procedure has engendered much 
controversy.  Most commentators appear to be opposed to the 
elimination of the Dodd-Frank mechanism.33 One scholar, 
while acknowledging that the OLA is not perfect, nevertheless, 
recognizes it as an essential tool for government regulators to 
ensure that the financial crisis attributable to a particular SIFI 
does not escalate to a broader financial crisis.  Substituting a 
bankruptcy judge’s determination would be far less effective 
than that of highly experienced financial regulators who have 
extensive oversight over the U.S. economy.34  These regulators 
are better able to deal with the complexities of the financial 
system and its relationship with the global economy in place of 
a bankruptcy judge lacking the overall experience of the 
regulators.35  On the other hand, bankruptcy judges are more 
concerned with protecting the rights of creditors rather than 
determining what is best for the overall financial economy of 
the U.S.36 
 
 Another scholar noted that there were three main 
criticisms of the OLA:  (1) that it creates a moral hazard by 
allegedly encouraging investors to take more risks because it 
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gives the government authority to resolve a failed entity, 
making it more likely to step in if the entity is “too-big-to-fail”; 
(2) the FDIC is given too much discretion under the OLA 
because it does not require it to use the “single-point-of-
entry”37 in the event of a crisis but may take options treating 
creditors differently that they had anticipated; and (3) that the 
use of bankruptcy procedures is better than the existing 
mechanism.  The response to the criticism is (a) the financial 
firms, such as General Electric, that have been designated 
SIFIs instituted structural changes to conform to will no longer 
be subject to enhanced prudential standards; (b) the complaint 
can be resolved without the need for ending the OLA; and (c) 
the bankruptcy procedure is inadequate for large banks and 
institutions during a financial crisis and may require financial 
government intervention to prevent widespread disruption.  
Also, under Dodd-Frank, failing firms are to use the 
bankruptcy procedure and are required to have “living wills” 
negating OLA’s involvement as a last resort.38  
 
 Constitutional objections have also been raised, namely, 
under Section 202 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  This section, 
Judicial Review, provides for the commencement of orderly 
liquidation via a petition to the federal district court when there 
is a determination by the Treasury Secretary that a financial 
company satisfies the requirements establishing that the 
financial company is in default or in danger of default and that 
such failure would have a serious adverse effect on the 
financial stability of the U.S. and no other viable alternative is 
available.39  If the board of directors of the financial company 
objects to the petition then the corporation is to be appointed as 
receiver.40  The determination is to be confidential without 
public disclosure, and the court is to determine whether the 
finding of the secretary is arbitrary and capricious.41  If the 
court does not make a determination within 24 hours then the 
Secretary is authorized to appoint the corporation as receiver 
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and liquidation is to take place automatically and immediately 
without further notice.  Appeal is limited.  There are criminal 
penalties for persons who recklessly disclose the determination 
of the Secretary of the petition and pendency of the 
proceeding.42  
 
 There appears to be serious constitutional objections to 
the secrecy of the proceedings; the criminal nature of any 
disclosure (reason for the provision is to avoid panic in the 
financial markets) that raises First Amendment freedom of 
speech issues; the limited time element for a court to make a 
determination; the mandatory nature of liquidation when other 
alternatives may be more properly available which may raise 
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause; the limited nature of judicial 
review; and other related constitutional issues.43  
 
 President Trump appears to favor the elimination of the 
OLA.  In a memorandum to the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
President directed the Secretary to review the authority of the 
OLA within 180 days from April 21, 2017, consider the 
potential adverse effects of failing financial on the financial 
stability of the U.S.; whether invoking OLA could engender a 
cost to the Treasury; whether OLA’s availability could lead to 
excessive risk taking by creditors, counterparties, and 
shareholders; whether a new chapter of the Bankruptcy Code 
would be a superior method of resolving the resolution of 
failing companies; OLA’s anticipated direct and indirect 
effects; and recommendation for improvement, if any, for 
legislative changes.44  
 
 In another memorandum issued the same day, this one 
concerning FSOC, the President directed the Secretary of the 
Treasury to conduct a thorough review of FCO’s determination 
and designation processes.  He sought information on whether 
the processes are sufficiently transparent; provide entities with 
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adequate due process; give market participants the expectation 
that the Federal Government will shield supervised or 
designated entities from bankruptcy.  He also sought an 
evaluation of a nonbank financial company’s vulnerability to 
material financial distress; whether any determination as to 
whether a nonbank financial company’s material financial 
distress could threaten the financial stability of the United 
States; and whether these processes adequately consider the 
costs of any determination or designation on the regulated 
entity.45 
 
Repeal of the Volcker Rule:   
 
The Choice Act repeals The Volcker Rule, the name of 
which refers to the former Federal Reserve Chair.  Paul 
Volcker, Federal Reserve Board Chair under both Presidents 
Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, and Ronald Reagan, a Republican, 
instituted the Rule while acting as Chairman of the Economic 
Recovery Advisory Board under President Barack Obama.  
The financial crisis of 2007 and the events that brought about 
the closing of numerous banks for the first time since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, led to an examination of the causes of 
the 2007 Recession.  Historically, there were bank panics 
approximately every two decades since the founding of the 
nation but none for five decades after the Glass-Steagall Act of 
193346 separation of investment from commercial banks 
instituted under President Franklin Roosevelt.   
 
 The separation ended with the passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 which permitted banks to engage in 
security offerings and insurance services.47 A major factor for 
bank closings allegedly was the removal of the said separation.  
Although the current President, Donald Trump, stated that he 
wants to break up the large banking entities effectively by 
reviving the prior separation of banking entities,48 it is unclear 
83 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
whether the president will follow through inasmuch as his 
Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, and his economic 
adviser, Gary Cohn, stated that a “21st Century” version of the 
Glass Steagall Act will be endorsed, with its meaning being 
unclear.49   
 
 Pursuant to Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, a new 
Section 13 was added to the Bank Holding Act.  The “Volcker 
Rule” prohibits an insured depositary institution and holding 
company controlling an insured depositary institution from 
engaging in proprietary trading or from acquiring or retaining 
an ownership interest, sponsoring, or having certain 
relationships with hedge funds or private equity funds.  
“Proprietary trading” was given a broad definition that 
includes:  acting as a principal or custodian for an affiliated 
party; for a trading account used by the entity to acquire or be 
financially involved in short-term resale; the prohibition of 
purchasing, selling, or otherwise acquiring or dispensing of 
stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments for the bank’s own 
account.  It covers both banking entities and nonbank (shadow 
banking) institutions.  Title VI of the Choice Act50 repeals 
Section 619 (the Volcker Rule) and related provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.   
 
 The repeal the Volcker Rule has generated more 
controversy than may have been anticipated.  Those scholars 
favoring the Rule describe the proposed repeal in terms such as 
“amnesia” by the negligent or deliberate lack of memory 
concerning the financial crisis that caused the Rule to be 
enacted.  In order to prevent banks from being “too-big-to-fail 
and making use of the Federal Reserve Bank’s discount 
window, banks should not be permitted to gamble with 
taxpayer funds.51 Arguments for the repeal as stated before a 
House Capital Markets, Securities and Investment 
Subcommittee in March of 2017 include the alleged inability of 
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American businesses to obtain affordable financing for long-
term growth; their significant increased borrowing costs; lower 
investment returns for households; harmful effects on corporate 
bond liquidity causing dealers to be more restrictive in 
providing liquidity during times of stress; additional 
restrictions on market making an underwriting activities, all of 
which serve to impact businesses and restrict their ability to 
finance short-term needs and plan for long-term growth.52  
 
SIFI Designation Repeal:  
 
 The newly created Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (“FSOC”), pursuant to Section 111 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, was given the power to designate banks and nonbanks for 
supervision by the Financial Stability Board.  There are 
exceptions for trading in U.S. government securities, 
underwriting and market-related activities, trading on behalf of 
customers.  FSOC’s designation of a financial institution as a 
“systemically important financial institution” – or SIFI – would 
bring about a panoply of heightened prudential standards that 
are onerous to the designated firm.   
 
 The designation as a SIFI has been extremely 
controversial.  Thus, when General Electric Capital 
Corporation received the designation, it sold off billions of 
dollars of assets to remove the said designation.  MetLife’s 
designation on December 18, 2014 was particularly contentious 
because it is essentially an insurance company with allegedly 
far less risk investments than the banking sector.  It 
commenced litigation to invalidate the designation and to date 
has been successful at the District Court level.53 It is pending 
appeal but there are indications that the current administration 
may rescind its appeal of the decision.54   
 
Impact on Community Banks 
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 A major concern underlying the Choice Act is the 
impact of federal regulation on smaller financial institutions 
which lack the resources to comply with onerous regulations.  
The Economist publication illustrates the difficulty by 
reference to the merger of Standard Financial, a bank with 
some $488 million and nine branches, with Allegheny Valley 
Bancorp a smaller neighboring bank in a Pittsburgh suburb.  
The main reason for the merger, quoting the CEO of Standard, 
was the cost of regulatory compliance that would not have 
occurred but for the cost.  Larger banks inherently are more 
able to afford personnel assuring regulatory compliance while 
smaller entities operating on a smaller profit margin can ill 
afford the additional regulatory cost structure.  Alleged proof 
of the effect of regulations is the number of community banks 
that have failed – over 400 – with only five new banks in 
existence, which provide 43 percent of small business loans 
nationally.  The cost of compliance is illustrated by the 
additional personnel required to service mortgages, which is at 
the heart of community bank lending.55  The Independent 
Community Bankers of America, an organization representing 
some 5,800 community banks is supportive of the Choice Act 
provisions reforming and lessening mortgage lending 
requirements.56  
 
 It appears that relief for community banks is bipartisan 
but Democrats object to the overall dismantling of the Dodd-
Frank Act and would support a separate bill for community 
bank regulatory relief.57 There appears to be mixed reactions to 
the bill from the banking sector.  The American Bankers 
Association (“ABA”) President and CEO, Rob Nichols, 
signified the ABA’s support of the bill, which he described as 
providing “much-needed regulatory relief.”58 The publication 
American Banker, on the other hand, decries the claim of the 
chair of the committee that community banks are in a crisis due 
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to the Dodd-Frank Act.  It alleges that the claim is divorced 
from reality in two respects, namely, that the main 
beneficiaries of the legislation are the megabanks, not the vast 
majority of community banks and that the challenges that 
community banks have been subjected to predate and were 
unrelated to the post 2007 financial crisis.  It cited the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, which illustrated that the top 
four banks accounted for 89 percent of all notional derivatives 
and 96 percent of credit derivatives.  It noted that the 2009 Act 
as stated above undermines the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, nullifies key shareholder rights of all but the largest 
shareholders, eliminates the orderly liquidation authority of the 
FDIC, and nullifies the Volcker Rule that reinstitute the risks 
posed by the pre-2007 crisis59.   
 
 The author further noted that the Dodd-Frank Act 
imposed few restrictions on community banks, which, except 
for six community banks of 5,000, were not subject to stress 
tests that were applicable only to banks with over $10 billion in 
consolidated assets and heightened requirements applicable to 
banks with over $50 billion in consolidated assets.  The Dodd-
Frank Act’s exemption of banks from most of the regulatory 
requirements having a 10 percent capital ratio is likely not 
sufficient to avert a further crisis should a 2007 scenario arise 
new.  A safer capital ratio for regulatory exemptions should be 
in the range of 20 to 30 percent.60  Other observers, however, 
while acknowledging the resiliency of community banks in 
attempting to comply with regulatory requirements, 
nevertheless note they have been seriously harmed in their 
attempt to grow and serve customers in their community.  With 
an average of 42 employees for medium-size banks, they do 
not have the capacity to understand, train and test for 
compliance, and apply the multiplicity of rules and regulations 
required of them.61  
 
87 / Vol 38 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 In an extensive study by the Congressional Research 
Service,62 it determined that, although the regulatory burden for 
small banks has increased in absolute terms, but not so in 
comparison with larger banks due to accommodations in recent 
rules and regulations since the financial crisis.  It is 
exemplified by the fact that 13 of 14 “major rules” of baking 
regulators include either exemptions for small banks or the 
regulations are tailored to reduce the cost from small banks.  
The one exception provides regulatory relief for securities 
backed by capital frequently issued by small banks.  None of 
these regulations are likely to negatively affect the ability of 
small banks to compete with large banks although there may be 
some effect in competitive dealings with nonbanks.  It further 
concluded that overestimating the regulatory burden on small 
banks may lead to policy changes that may have negative 
consequences for consumers, banks, and the broader economy.  
Underestimating the regulatory burden could result in further 
consolidation of banks which, in turn, may lead to shifting of 
assets from banks to the shadow banking system.63 
 
ECONOMIC GROWTH, REGULATORY RELIEF, AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 
 
 The Choice Act, which was not adopted by the 
Congress, was followed by the Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act64 which was passed by 
the Senate but not yet adopted by the House.  The Act is 
composed of seven titles, which include the establishments of 
lower regulatory requirements and oversight from the FSOC 
for banks between $50 billion and $250 billion in assets; the 
exemption from the Volcker Rule that bans banks from 
engaging in speculative trades for banks with less than $10 
billion in assets and their total trading assets and trading 
liabilities that do not exceed more than five percent of total 
consolidated assets; the requirement that the Federal Reserve 
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not regulate banks in a “one size fits all” thus removing major 
roadblocks from community banks in their lending policies; 
and the allowance of foreign banks to avoid U.S. regulatory 
scrutiny by tallying their U.S. assets in a manner to keep them 
under the $250 billion threshold.65 
 
 The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act differs from the Choice Act in that its 
limits the scope of the Volcker Rule rather than provide for its 
total repeal.  Unlike the Dodd-Frank Act, which faced near 
total Republican opposition and total Democrat Senate support, 
the Crapo bill (named for its sponsor Sen. Mike Crapo 
(Republican of Idaho), did have some Democrat support by its 
easing of restrictions on more local community banks.  
Individuals applying for mortgages in the post-Dodd-Frank era 
experienced significant roadblocks which often dissuaded 
otherwise eligible applicants from purchasing homes.  
Community banks, which relied on the issuance of mortgages 
for home purchases as a mainstream of their profitability found 
themselves unable to make loans in many cases due to the 
inordinate governmental regulatory restrictions.  Community 
banks would have fared better under the Choice Act that has an 
“off-ramp” feature that allowed a qualifying banking 
organization of any size to elect to be exempt from risk-
weighted capital requirements and other restrictions but the 
Crapo bill lessened oversight for banks with under $10 billion 
in total assets as stated above.66  
 
PRESIDENT TRUMP AND THE ENVIRONMENT AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
Environmental Regulatory Changes 
 
 Although a Republican President, Richard Nixon, was 
responsible for much of the major legislation to protect the 
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environment, the Trump administration has made a concerted 
effort to remove alleged barriers to employment due to 
regulations pursuant to federal statutory obligations.  National 
Geographic, in a lengthy presentation, recited a summary of 
decisions and actions that directed contradict decades of 
protection.67 Among the changes is the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s proposed rule that the Agency to only 
consider scientific studies for which the underlying data is 
made available publicly, The problem, according to at least 
1,000 scientists who oppose the rule change, is that much of 
the underlying data is based on personal health information 
which cannot be made publicly available due to privacy 
concerns.  The Department of the Interior submitted a rule 
change that removes protection for threatened wildlife species.  
Other changes affecting the environment is the rollback of car 
emissions standards; the reorganization of an EPA group that 
funds research on children’s health and environmental health 
disparities; FEMA expelling of “climate change” from its 
strategic plan; cuts to clean-energy programs; loosening of 
regulations on toxic air pollution; removal of the U.S. from the 
Paris Accord (the only country in the world to do so); the 
proposal to scrap clean power plan; the halting of mining 
health studies; and numerous other anti-environmental 
programs.68  
 
Consumer Protection Changes 
 
 The Dodd-Frank Act created in Title X, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act, which established the consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau as an independent agency within 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  The 
Bureau has been aggressive in combatting anti-consumer 
actions by credit card companies, pay-day loans that seriously 
jeopardize by grossly inflated interest charges loans made to 
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low income employees who require immediate moneys for 
payment of necessary daily living expenses.   
 
President Trump’s appointment of Director Mick 
Mulvaney signaled the end of its mission to protect consumers.  
The Bureau, albeit not ended, nevertheless has taken no 
punitive measures against any alleged wrongdoers and has not 
sought any funding for the investigation and prosecution of 
actions against consumers.  It has essentially ended its 
investigation of Equifax with respect to a massive data breach; 
ended investigations of discriminatory lending practices against 
minorities, and let go a myriad of other alleged offenses against 
consumers.69   
 
PROS AND CONS OF REGULATION 
 
 As with almost any statutory and regulatory enactment, 
there are winners and losers, but the goal of governmental 
action is to provide for the betterment of the common good – 
particularly when there are societal difficulties that need to be 
addressed.  The problem arises that the philosophical 
differences make compromise exceedingly difficult particularly 
when the media reflects the nation’s deep divide and its 
audience listens only to the viewpoint desired by it.  Thus, 
while congressional representatives may individually desire to 
compromise their views for the benefit of their constituencies, 
the fear of retribution from extremist elements within their 
particular parties supported by extreme media outlets cause 
them to maintain uncompromising extreme views.  The 
question posed in this Article is whether the regulatory regime 
created under different political administrations warrants 
significant downsizing or reform to accomplish the statutory 
goals of protection for the common good.  There are major 
arguments that have some merit for either viewpoint.   
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Arguments in Favor of Regulation 
 
 The crisis of 2007 reflected major problems in the 
financial system that led to systemic risks that ultimately 
almost caused the collapse of the U.S. and global economies.  
With a decade to reflect on the events leading up to the crisis it 
becomes clearer to economists and policy makers what 
occurred and the options available to both end the economic 
downturn and attempt to prevent at least near future financial 
catastrophes.  Among the arguments favoring government 
regulation is that it assists in keeping the markets competitive 
especially by prosecuting anti-monopolistic behavior; gives 
voice to consumers who often are ignored in the manipulations 
accompanying market activities such as drugs, stocks, and 
other commodity pricing; and compels greater transparency 
and freedom in the marketplace.70   
 
The Geneva Report on Financial Regulation affirms in 
great part the regulatory environment such as that promulgated 
under Dodd-Frank.71 Reflecting in large measure the financial 
bubble that burst in 2007 and immediately thereafter, it 
recommends both macro- and micro-prudential approaches for 
governmental regulation.  It further recommends greater 
intervention in global markets to encourage competition and 
prevent oligopolistic behavior.  Macro-prudential regulation 
should be countercyclical to negate the effect of bubbles whose 
bursting can lead to global distress.  Regulators should agree 
on those sectors of the economy of systemic institutions that 
could cause disruptions and seek global solutions and 
cooperation.72 
 
Arguments Alleging Excessive Regulation Impede Economic 
Growth 
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 The essence of the claim that excessive regulation 
impedes growth was succinctly stated in Forbes Magazine.  It 
recited that middle-class households received 15 percent less 
credit while wealthy households received increased credit of 21 
percent; the nation’s five largest banks control 44 percent of all 
U.S. banking assets; the Dodd-Frank Act resulted in 24,000 
pages of regulations although one-quarter more of the required 
some 400 regulations are yet to be finalized; that the Volcker 
Rule which made the corporate bond market less liquid was 
created although evidenced lacked that proprietary trading 
contributed to the financial crisis; and that FSOC’s 
extraordinary power to designate nonbanks SIFIs wrongfully 
designated insurance companies (Prudential and MetLife) as 
SIFIs causing them to be subject to prudential enhancement 
even though they did not contribute to the crisis.73   
 
Did Bank Regulations Impede Financial Stability? 
 
 It appears that the large banks required to undergo 
stress testing under the Dodd-Frank Act have not suffered from 
the Act’s requirements.  On June 28, 2017, it was reported that 
all of the 34 largest U.S. banks required to undergo such testing 
had passed it thereby permitted to return 100 percent of profits 
at their option to investors in place of 65 percent last year.  
Even previously troubled banks, such as Citibank, Wells Fargo 
(which had undergone extraordinary scandal of creating 
fraudulent accounts),74 and the American units of Santander 
Holdings USA and Deutsche Bank have met regulatory 
standards.75 Nevertheless, although the largest banks have 
managed to recover from their major downturn and near 
demise of a decade ago, the question remains whether 
nonbanks (shadow banks) and community banks have also 
shared in the financial upturn.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The above discussion reflects the philosophical 
differences of the two major political parties.  Although the 
Dodd-Frank Act was enacted without any Republican legislator 
voting for the Act to address the financial crisis of a decade 
ago, the question arose whether the enormous scope of the 
enactment was excessive.  Republican legislators have 
historically been opposed to government intrusion, particularly 
in the financial sector, in the belief that the market should bear 
the positive and negative consequences of actions taken by all 
sectors of the economy.  The Choice Act does reflect the 
philosophical views of the President, his key advisers, and the 
Republican Party.76  
 
There are valid arguments both for and against 
significant changes in the Dodd-Frank all-encompassing 
regulatory system that Democrats also agree warrant revisiting.  
Nevertheless, it appears that the Choice Act and subsequent 
proposed legislation appear to ignore the origin and purposes 
for the 2010 Act.  In any event, the discussion may be moot 
inasmuch as the Trump Administration may simply refuse to 
enforce the Dodd-Frank mandates and regulatory scheme.  
Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, has indicated that he will 
simply not convene FSOC over which the Treasury 
Department jurisdiction.  The Dodd-Frank Act requires the 
Treasury Secretary to consent to decisions made by the 
Council.  The MetLife litigation whereby MetLife opposed its 
SIFI designation is on appeal and it appears that the 
Administration will not pursue the appeal and allow MetLife to 
prevail.  Thus, it remains to be seen whether the changes made 
legally and politically will bring about another crisis or, as the 
President alleges, the U.S. will be great again.   
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